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## Planned for Invasion of Cuba STATINTL

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GETTYSBURG, Pa., Sept. 11

President Eisenhower said today that no plans for an invasion of Cuba had been made before he left office.

He said he agreed as early as March, 1960, to help train some of the Cuban refugees then in this country. But he said that it would have been impossible to go beyond this because of the lack of cohesive leadership among the Cuban patriots. "But," he added, "there was absolutely no planning for an invasion in my Administration."

This disclaimer is in sharp contrast to what high officials of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations have said privately about the genesis of the ill-starred undertaking of last April, when Cuban refugees sailed to hold a beachhead.

It has heretofore been taken as fact that an invasion by American-trained Cuban guerrillas was projected as early as last November, but was held up on White House orders because of the impending change in Administrations.

A well informed source close to the White House commented after Mr. Eisenhower's statement:

"I'm sorry to say the General is in error. I not only know there were plans for an invasion while he was in office, there are documents to prove it."

General Eisenhower's comments on the Cuban incident came at the conclusion of a day of political socializing with thirty-eight freshman Republi-

cans moved to Gettysburg in chartered buses this morning for a tour of the famous Civil War battlefield. General Eisenhower served as their guide.

A brief visit to the Eisenhower farm near-by was also on the schedule, and the former President was host to his visitors at lunch in the Gettysburg Hotel in the early afternoon. At the conclusion of the lunch, he offered to answer questions from the Congressmen as well as from the accompanying newsmen.

It was in response to one of these questions that his comments on the Cuban invasion were given.

## Reports Rusk Call

In reply to another inquiry, General Eisenhower disclosed that he received a call from Secretary of State Dean Rusk this morning. He said Mr. Rusk had apologized for any "misapprehension" that might have been created through the issuance of a recent State Department publication on Berlin.

The publication in question was a booklet titled "Background Berlin—1961." It was issued about two weeks ago. Representative James F. Battin of Montana, one of the visitors, read a passage copied from the booklet and asked the General's comment. The passage as given by Mr. Battin follows:

"The Western armies could have captured Berlin, or at least joined in capturing it. But the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, believed they could be more usefully employed against major German forces elsewhere."

The implication of the statement, Mr. Battin explained, was that General Eisenhower's decision had proved to be a primary cause of the present difficulties over Berlin.

## Shows No Irritation

The General's response betrayed no irritation over the suggested implication. He briefly traced the genesis of the German settlement in the concluding year of the war. He pointed out that the final determination had been made by the political leaders of the Allied powers, and not by their military chieftains.

He personally had thought the partition plans ill-advised, he said, and sent his chief of staff from London to Malta in 1945 to present his misgivings to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Mr. Roosevelt was then on his way to the Malta Conference.

"But the powers that be thought differently," he recalled today. "We were soldiers, not politicians. A military decision is a rewording of history."

The call from Secretary Rusk,

he added, was to reassure him that the language of the State Department's report was intended "to be factual rather than critical."

As a battlefield guide, General Eisenhower proved to have both an expert's knowledge and a scholar's affection for his subject.

## Meets Delegation

As he met the arriving delegation, he was standing bareheaded at the foot of the monument to Gen. Robert E. Lee, looking ruddy and in exuberant good spirits. It was obvious that the Civil War continued to be a living experience to the old soldier.

For ten minutes he talked about the basic strength of the Gettysburg encounter; the impulses that drew Lee to this great and costly gamble; the cooperation with which the Union commander, Gen. George Gordon Meade, met the challenge. And from time to time, he digressed to give a parallel from his own or some other commander's experience.

Where he stood, he explained, was the take-off point for Gen. George Edward Pickett's famous charge, and he pointed to a clump of trees across the rolling, sun-drenched fields where it bloody ended.

Then the party loaded into buses with the general in the lead and giving a running commentary by short-wave radio, and began a two-hour tour

with numerous stops along Seminary Ridge, Little Round Top, High Water Mark and other historic landmarks.

He knew which brigade had held this hillock; why Jeb Stuart could not get his cavalry around Culp's Hill; the emplacements where Union cannon had torn the massed Confederates to ribbons.

Someone commented on the minuteness of his knowledge about the Gettysburg campaign.

"Well, I ought to," the general shot back with a grin. "I spent three days here as a cadet, and we had to go every mile of this place by foot. And I've been coming here ever since."

From the Battlefield Park, the caravan rolled up to the gates of the Eisenhower farm. There was a quick inspection of the cattle barn, and then

time out for pictures. General Eisenhower loitered casually against a whitewashed fence, and each of the thirty-eight Congressmen, beaming self-consciously, stepped up in turn to have his picture snapped shaking the general's hand.

It was a great day for the Congressmen, and it obviously was a great day for the veteran soldier-politician as well.